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I. INTRODUCTION
The patent system has traditionally been viewed as having two pri-
mary functions: the reward function and the prospect function. Although
these theories do explain some behavior which results from the practical
applications of the patent system, they also overlook some behavior of
the patent system which indicates a failure of these functions. In order
to properly prevent such failure, this paper proposes that the patent sys-
tem adopt an orientation that will lead to increased innovative rivalry
and competition. In Part I, using the computer operating system soft-
ware market as an example, I propose a framework for re-
conceptualizing patent protection as it applies to software operating
system platforms. Part II briefly examines both the classical and neo-
classical reward function and prospect function theories.2 Part III de-
fines the innovation market and describes the market dynamics that
create disincentives for innovation. These disincentives tend to limit the
2. In the context of patent law, the classical reward function theorists are those who
use natural law as a basis of describing the function of intellectual property rights, and argue
that patent rights serve as incentives for inventive activity. Although there were some early
criticisms of the natural rights/incentives theories, the reward function became entrenched as
the predominant view of patent rights. For a historical review, see EDITH TILTON PENROSE,
THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM (1951); Fritz Machlup & Edith
Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. Econ. Hist. 1 (1950). Neo-
classical reward theory relies on classical theory, but focuses on the type and means of
granting rewards. Prospect theory largely developed as a critical response to reward theory.
For a discussion of the various theories, see Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theory of
Patents-The Not-Quite Holy-Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 267 (1996).
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number of competitors in innovation markets and create conditions
which reduce the effectiveness of the reward incentives to the extent
that the reward function fails in its entirety. Part IV examines the re-
sulting harms of this failure and identifies how reward function failure
affects product markets, which are dependent upon the reward function.
Part V discusses why the prospect function does not address the prob-
lems related to reward function failure and the reasons that the
promotion of innovative rivalry would alleviate some of the problems.
Part VI uses the relationship between computer programs to illustrate
the shortcomings of the patent system's inability to prevent the prob-
lems created by non-competitive innovation. This section also considers
how the patent system might be better adjusted to prevent reward func-
tion failure. Lastly, Part VI also proposes a series of alternative
frameworks for creating a competitively oriented approach to the appli-
cation of the patent system in the case of computer software platforms.
II. TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
The genesis of the economic analysis of the patent system is a result
of the U.S. Constitution's initial economic assertion related to the pro-
motion of the "Progress of Science and useful Arts."3 Economists and
legal scholars, when examining patent scope and innovative improve-
ments in light of this assertion, have long considered the patent system
as a framework serving two primary functions: the prospect function
and the reward function.4 Although theorists have used total innovative
output as a gauge of the benefits created by the patent system, much of
the research in these areas has used economics, specifically allocative
efficiency, as a measuring stick in determining the patent system's pref-
erence over alternative frameworks that provide protection through
trade secrecy.
A. The Reward Theory
The earliest and most widely accepted theory related to the patent
system is that it serves as a means of providing rewards to those who
develop and disclose ideas and products in the areas of science and
3. See U. S. CONST. art I, §§ 8, el. 8; see also Kenneth W.'Dam, The Economic Under-
pinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 248 (1994).
4. See generally, Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation,
78 VA. L. Rnv. 305, 310-316 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic
Appraisal (1973); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 265 (1977).
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technology.6 Much of the basis for the patent system has been based on
this theory. The exclusive ownership rights are incentives for inventors
to disclose their inventions rather than withhold them as trade secrets.
Both monopoly rights, as well as laws to protect the infringement of
those rights, allow the inventor to recoup the costs of research and de-
velopment as well as earn a fair amount of remuneration for the
disclosure of the idea.8 Ultimately, the reward function utilizes legal
devices to create incentives for technological innovation and disclosure
by means of granting rewards which are otherwise unrecognizable by
the innovator. These rewards are also essentially a quid pro quo ex-
change for the public benefit based on both the innovation and
disclosure of technology.
Building on the general principle of the reward-oriented function of
patents, the reward theory has been split into two factions: weak reward
theory and strong reward theory The key difference between the fac-
tions is that the supporters of the weak theory view the reward function
broadly and view its function as a general inventive stimulant.' In con-
trast, supporters of the strong theory support patent rights for only those
inventions which are "patent-induced."' 1 A third set of theorists have
proposed that rent dissipation is the proper theoretical framework for
analyzing the way the reward function provides incentives for innova-
tion. 2
6. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 4, at 310. See also Senate Subcomm. On Pat-
ents, Trademarks and Copyrights, Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., An
Economic Review of the Patent System (Comm. Print 1958, Study No. 15, Fritz Machlup).
7. See Dam supra note 3, at 270-71.
8. See id. at 247.
9. See Grady & Alexander supra note 4, at 312-13.
10. See Bowman, supra note 5, at 21-28.
11. See A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Inventive Protection in the Twenty-First
Century, 38 Am. U. L. Rav. 1097 (1989); see also Frederic M. Scherer, Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance 440-58 (2d ed. 1980).
12. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 4, at 308-310; 316-21. Rent dissipation theory
holds that the difference between an innovation's development costs and the price society
will pay for the innovation is a form of rent, an economic reward which is created by the
innovation. Proponents of the theory argue that the rent should be awarded to the inventor as
a property right, in order to provide incentives for innovation. Rent dissipation occurs when
conduct reduces the value of the rent which is awarded, thus limiting the incentives. Dissi-
pation may occur by redundant innovative development, redundant development of
improvements, and excessive investment in protecting the secrecy of the innovation. These
forms of dissipation adversely affect the incentives for innovation, thus creating the need to
limit rent dissipating activity. See id.
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B. Kitch's Prospect Theory
Edmund Kitch has made the seminal argument for the use of the
prospect function in determining the patent system's development. Pro-
fessor Kitch argues that a major function of the patent system is to
maximize the efficiency of technological innovation. 3 Kitch identifies
patents as "prospects," and argues that the general attributes of
"prospecting" form the basis of inventive behavior.4 Analogizing pat-
ents to mineral claims, Kitch reviews the policy implications of treating
patents as prospects and presents numerous justifications for the su-
premacy of the prospect approach. 5
In his analogy, Kitch argues that the establishment of a patent claim
is similar to staking out a mineralization prospect. Both mineralization
claims and patents are limited based on breadth and time and are based
on a priority system that rewards the first to discover and register the
claim. 6 Additionally, commercial significance is not required for either
an enforceable mineralization claim or for a valid patent. Although there
are systemic similarities, the key analogous characteristics of the miner-
alization claim and patent systems are the incentives to stake and later
exploit the prospects and the exclusive rights which attach to valid
claims. Once these exclusive rights are granted, the holder can develop
the prospect without fear that other individuals will exploit the claim.
Others are on notice to claim other mineralizations or patents which do
not overlap or infringe upon the original stakeholder. Furthermore, both
systems create a uniform framework for the identification and exploita-
tion of property rights, as well as restrictions on abusive use of such
rights.
Analogizing the mineralization claim system to the patent system
led Kitch to establish several conclusions. Most significantly, identify-
ing a patent as a prospect establishes a future right to develop the
technological prospect. Kitch argues that unification of control over re-
search and development of the particular patent prospect provides the
most efficient means for developing the technology.17 Multiple and re-
dundant inventive efforts may result in wasteful resource usage or
infringing developments." The disclosure elements of the patent system
also serve to prevent wasteful resource allocation. Under Kitch's model,
the establishment of patent claims does not merely provide information
13. See Kitch, supra note 5, at 245-80.
14. Id. at 267.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 271-75.
17. See id. at 285-86.
18. See id.
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to the public; it also creates a mechanism to direct the allocation of re-
search and development resources away from patented technology and
towards pioneer innovations.
Kitch concludes that when an inventor presents a broad scale inven-
tion, the patent scope should be granted broadly in order to allow for the
coordination of research and development. This coordination will pre-
vent inefficient innovation and redirect inventive resources away from
competitive uses. While some scholars have criticized this conclusion,19
it has been cited as a significant argument against the development of a
competitive approach to technological innovation.20
The prospect function analysis is consistent with other allocative ef-
ficiency-based theories of the law. 2' Nonetheless, the prospect function
analysis fails to account for other efficiency models based on non-
monetizable qualities such as social efficiencies.' Whereas competitive
innovation may not be efficient in one economic model, it may be
maximally efficient in other models.' Therefore, modeling the patent
system's functionality on a particular efficiency model incorporates
certain value judgements related to the choice of that model. Kitch, by
modeling the patent system on monetizable types of allocative efficien-
cies, expressly rejects social efficiencies and other alternative welfare
models. Thus, his analysis fails to account for other economic ap-
proaches and, consequently, may deter the creation of beneficial
efficiencies which are created by these alternative models.
4
Despite the concerns related to Kitch's economic modeling, Kitch's
theory has significant implications related to the dynamics of the inven-
tive pool. The inventive pool, for the purposes of this paper, is the group
of innovators who are primarily focused on pioneering technological
innovation as a result of their endeavors in a particular technological
19. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 4, at 314-16. See also infra notes 84-87 and
accompanying text.
20. See Dam, supra note 3, at 264.
21. This efficiency-based approach largely sprouted from the writings of the Chicago
School of economics. See John P. Henderson, The History of Thought in the Development of
the Chicago Paradigm, The Chicago School of Political Economy 341 (Warren J. Samuels
ed., 1976); Warren J. Samuels, The Chicago School of Political Economy: A Constructive
Critique, The Chicago School of Political Economy 1 (Warren J. Samuels ed., 1976).
22. See Ezra J. Mishan, The Folklore of the Market: An Inquiry into the Economic
Doctrines of the Chicago School, The Chicago School of Political Economy 95 (Warren J.
Samuels ed., 1976).
23. See id. at 100-105.
24. See generally Mark R. Tool, Essays in Social Value Theory 33-51 (1986). This
concern has been shared by several other economic commentators. See, e.g., Howard F.
Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Invention, 26 RAND J. ECON 34
(1995); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and
the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
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area.25 Innovation in this context is considered the search, discovery,
development, and implementation of new or adapted technologies.26 De-
spite Kitch's assertions regarding the benefits created by efficiencies in
the innovation process, it has been argued that Kitch's efficiency-based
approach may be appropriate if the inventive pool is significant enough
to withstand a decrease in the protection of incentive-based doctrines.27
If the inventive pool is small, Kitch's efficiency based doctrines may
further decrease the pool by concentrating the rewards on those who
hold the original broad or pioneer patents.2
111. THE DYNAMICS OF THE INNOVATION MARKET:
REWARD FUNCTION FAILURE
The reward and prospect function theories do not explain all be-
havior in the area of technological innovation. Both theories fail to
recognize that other innovation market dynamics create disincentives
for pioneer inventive activity in markets which already have a protected
invention. These disincentives stem from the interaction of commercial
competitive advantages with intellectual property rights. When the
competitive advantages of the initial inventor are greater than the re-
wards which are granted to a subsequent pioneer inventor (second-
comer)29 by the patent system, the potential for optimal innovation is
diminished. I term the existence of these innovative disincentives re-
ward function failure.
25. Although improvements of technology are also products of the inventive pool, this
paper does not address the economics of improvement incentives, nor their market implica-
tions. Unlike pioneer inventions, improvements are predicated on a pre-developed invention
and have different incentives than pioneer efforts. Consequently, reviewing both of the in-
ventive efforts together would fail to properly distinguish their independent economic
significance. For an overview of the issues related to inventive improvements, see Mark A.
Lemiey, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REv. 989
(1997).
26. See William Kingston, The Thesis Chapters, Direct Protection of Innovation 1, 2
(William Kingston ed., 1987).
27. See Jerry Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential In-
novation, 26 RAND J. EcON. 20 (1995).
28. See Scotchmer, supra note 24, at 31-35.
29. In the context of this paper, a "second-comer" is a subsequent pioneer innovator and
not an improver. Whereas an improver bases his inventive efforts on developing a pre-
existing invention, a second-comer bases his efforts on the development of an alternative
invention that competes with other pioneer inventions. Although a second-comer may use
pre-existing scientific developments, the key distinction between a second-comer and im-
prover is the relative purpose of the inventive efforts. Therefore, if the innovation is meant to
improve upon a prior product rather than supplant it altogether, that innovation is not the
work of a second-comer.
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In reward function failure, potential second-comers are discouraged
from allocating inventive and financial resources towards a particular
innovative goal, even though competitive development may create vari-
ous market and consumer benefits. Such failure occurs in two contexts:
1) the limitation of the second-corner's ability to attain intellectual
property monopoly rights by legal doctrines, and 2) the second-comer's
limitation in gaining competitive advantages in the innovation market.
A. Ability to Attain Intellectual Property Rights
In apparent contradiction to the original intent, factors which dis-
courage innovation are fundamental elements of the intellectual
property rights granted by the government. Rights granted by the patent
system provide both incentives and rewards for inventive efforts. How-
ever, in order to provide such incentives and rewards, the legal rights
must provide protection from second-comers who are not deserving of
their own legal protection. Nonetheless, both the length of the rights and
the breadth of the rights may have unintended consequences which are
different from their protective intent.3" Rather than provide incentives
for inventors to research and develop inventions diligently in one spe-
cific area so as to make inventive improvements or alternative uses,
contemporary patent law serves to make potential inventors wary of in-
novation in an area in which patent rights have already been assigned.
Although these second-comers may be able to develop and innovate
products or improvements which satisfy the requirements of the Patent
Act, some patent law doctrines may raise enough uncertainty to retard
the inventors' efforts.
The issue of patent scope is central to the problem of inventive re-
tardation because the determination of scope inherently affects the
number of inventions which may be found to be infringing.31 Depending
on the breadth of the patent grant, inventors cannot sufficiently rely on
the certainty that their innovation will be recognized in its entirety.32
Additionally, the doctrine of equivalents adds uncertainty to patent
scope by expanding infringement beyond the literal meaning.3 Although
the doctrine of equivalents prevents second-comers from usurping rights
of the patent holder, it is equally possible that second-comers are exces-
30. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 CoLum. L. REv. 839, 868-871 (1990). For a discussion of how some unintended
consequences are manifested in relation to patenting behavior, see Josh Lerner, Patenting in
the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1995).
31. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 30, at 882.
32. See id.
33. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950); Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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sively restricted in their attempts to attain certain legal rights in new
technologies.T 4 Therefore, both the fundamentals of patent scope and the
definitions of infringement may discourage the inventor's incentive for
continuing development and research of a discrete invention in a dis-
crete technological area in which pioneer patents have already been
granted.35
B. Competitive Advantages of First Movers
Perhaps the most significant deterrent to second-comer innovation
is the competitive benefits which accrue to first-mover innovators.
These benefits, which are not without redeeming importance, nonethe-
less create advantages that are not easily duplicated for second-comers.
In fact, certain competitive benefits grant advantages which even the
patent system may not grant, especially in terms of time-related benefits
and mechanisms for market control. The two most significant competi-
tive benefits are first-mover advantages and compatibility/network
externalities.
First-mover advantages are established, not by being first to invent,
but by being first to successfully introduce the product to market.36
Therefore, first mover-advantages do not accrue based purely on inno-
vative efficiency; they accumulate as the result of a combination of
research and development advantages and historical market reactions.
The initial advantages that result from early exploitation involve
learning benefits. These learning effects, which have the impact of es-
tablishing cost advantages, are primarily relevant to creating research
34. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 30, at 853-60.
35. Professors Merges and Nelson term this type of inventive behavior as the "discrete
invention model." They write:
[The discrete invention model] assumes that an invention is discrete and well-
defined, created through the inventors insight and hard work. In the standard dis-
cussions it may be recognized that the original invention can be improved, or even
that improvement of complementary advances may need to be made if the inven-
tion is to be of much use. The basic invention may be amenable to tailoring for
different uses or customers. But it is implicit that the invention does not point the
way to wide ranging subsequent technical advances. It does not define any broad
prospect.
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 30, at 880.
36. See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by
Historical Events, 99 ECON J. 116, 123 (1989).
37. See id. at 116.
38. See William E. Cohen, Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of Installed
Base and Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST W. 535, 537 (1996) (citing A. Michael
Spence, Competition, Entry, and Antitrust Policy, in Strategy Predation, and Antitrust Analy-
sis 45, 65-66 (Steven C. Salop ed., 1981).
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and development advantages for future innovations.39 The sooner an in-
ventor enters the learning curve, the less pronounced the curve will be
for future innovative developments.40 Furthermore, although the learn-
ing advantages may vary in degree, the first-mover gains a sizable
advantage when the learning curve is moderate.4"
Although the learning benefits may provide first-movers with some
competitive advantage, these advantages are more damaging to innova-
tion incentives when they are supplemented by early market
introduction and exploitation. Early exploitation of a product with no
marketable substitute and the subsequent growth of an installed base
creates competitive advantages which shape later development.42 Be-
cause of the lack of substitutability, the market is likely to adopt the first
invention more readily than it would if there were competitive products.
This market adoption creates switching costs which may, if too high,
effectively lock-in consumers to the installed base.43
The problem with the installed base from the second-coiner's per-
spective relates to establishing market adoption of the substitute goods.
Foremost, if the installed base is significant in size, the lesser likelihood
of a successful market entry by a second innovation might deter a sec-
ond-comer from focusing on developing a rivalrous product. Although a
second-comer may be potentially successful in introducing a discrete
invention which is substitutable to that of the first-mover, it is only in
rare cases where a second product successfully overthrows a large in-
stalled base."4 Therefore, second-comers are likely to be deterred from
innovating on the scale of the original developer. Follow-up research
and supplemental improvement become the inventive goal, rather than
the development of pioneer research and discrete substitute product in-
novation.
The second competitive advantage which deters second-comer ri-
valrous innovation is the system of network externalities and
compatibility effects which attend to a large installed base, especially in
39. See Cohen, supra note 38; Cf. Spence, supra note 38, at 537.
40. See Cohen supra note 38, at 537-38.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 538.
43. See generally Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Dynamic Competition with Switching
Costs, 19 RAND J. EcON. 123 (1988); Michael L. Katz. & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition
and Network Effects, J. EcON. PERSp., Spring 1994 at 93.
44. An example of this is the Betamax/VHS competition in the video-taping machine
market. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern
of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 283, 314-316 (1996) (hereinafter referred to as
Technology Choice).
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computer and communications technology.45 Network externalities, as
defined by Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro, are "the utility that a given
user derives from the good depend[ent] upon the number of other users
who are in the same 'network.' 46 These benefits are usually supple-
mental to installed base advantages, but the two often forge a symbiotic
relationship. The greater the installed base, the greater likelihood that
the network externalities will attract more users to the installed base.
Network externalities are not only limited to positive effects, but may
also generate negative or pecuniary effects.47 For a second-comer inno-
vator, the introduction of a rival discrete innovation (which is not an
improvement, but rather a substitutable innovation) will likely not pro-
duce sufficient network externalities to attract new users. Thus, the first
innovation to market has significant advantages in expanding the exter-
nalities past the point of competitive vulnerability.
While network externalities do not discourage innovation entirely,
their existence does affect the way second-comers identify their paths of
innovation. The relevancy of path dependence theory in the technical
innovation is based on the principle that small-scale advantages of a
particular technology can create substantial influences on the market
dynamics of that technology." The theory holds, in the case of techno-
logical innovation, that a substitutable rival does not easily replace a
technology with a large installed base.
49
In order for network benefits to flow through to second-comer inno-
vations, there must be a degree of compatibility which allows the
second-coiner's innovation -to complement, rather than supplant, the
innovation upon which the installed base is predicated. As a conse-
quence of this necessary compatibility, a second-comer will likely be
45. Technologies which are prevalent in network industries such as telecommunications
and computer related industries typically reflect the networks externalities. Although there
are numerous technologies which don't have high network externalities, these technologies
are usually the basis for products which do not involve product compatibility components.
See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J.
EcoN. PERsp., Spring 1994 at 135. See also Dennis W. Carlton & J. Mark Klamer, The Need
for Coordination Among Firms, with Special Reference to Network Industries, 50 U. CHi. L.
Rv. 446,450 (1983).
46. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compati-
bility, 75 Amt. EcoN. REv. 424, at 424 (1985).
47. See generally, S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a
New Source of Market Failure?, 17 Rns. L. & EON. 1 (1995). Cf. Liebowitz & Margolis,
Technology Choice, supra note 44, at 283, 287.
48. See Liebowitz & Margolis, Technology Choice, supra note 44, at 288.
49. See id. at 291.
50. See Cohen, supra note 38, at 551.
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deterred from developing a non-compatible equivalent product.5 ' This
discouragement from innovation may restrain the introduction of inno-
vations which may, on their own merits, be as equally marketable as the
first-mover's product was at the time of its introduction or even after
improvement.52 Therefore, it is arguable that the first-mover's mastery
of the product market's relevant externalities may deter an innovator
from choosing such a product to innovate.
IV. THE PROBLEMS OF REWARD FUNCTION FAILURE:
HARMS TO RELATED PRODUCT INNOVATION
Although I have identified why certain legal, economic and market
factors deter entrants from competitively innovating similar products, it
is important to understand how these disincentives are injurious to the
development of primary and secondary product markets.53 The injury
manifests in three different ways: 1) products are introduced at a stage
of innovation which creates a sub-optimal product, 2) primary product
markets which are dependent on intellectual property rights have few
large competitors who tend to have significant market power in their
product market, and 3) consumer welfare is harmed by limited choice in
the primary product markets.
A. Sub-Optimal Innovation
In markets in which there is little or no competition, there is a ten-
dency to innovate sub-optimally. 54  Consequently, the product
development may occur inefficiently once there is no threat of improved
51. See id. See also Richard J. Gilbert, Symposium on Compatibility: Incentives and
Market Structure, 40 J. INDUs. ECON. 1 (1992); Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau, "Mix
and Match": Product Compatibility Without Network Externalities, 19 RAND J. ECON. 221
(1988).
52. See Liebowitz & Margolis, Technology Choice, supra note 44, at 289, 307. The re-
luctance to innovate may create adverse consequences which result from path dependence. It
has been argued that path dependence is created when one technological product's advan-
tages in a particular market has significant ramifications for the development of the
economies of that market. See Arthur, supra note 36, at 126; See generally, S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205
(1995).
53. In the context of this discussion, primary products are those technological develop-
ments which are used to enable other compatible products or technologies. A primary
product may possess some individual functionality, but is best thought of as an enabling
product. Secondary products are those which are dependent upon a primary product for im-
plementation or execution. Without a primary product, secondary products would have no
independent use.
54. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 30, at 873.
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substitutable products. 5 Similar concerns exist in relation to product
innovation prior to market introduction. 6 Nonetheless, unlike the im-
provement market in which there is already a baseline product, the
members of the inventive pool do not have a baseline product upon
which to base their innovation. 7 As mentioned above, it is possible, be-
cause of the first-mover advantages, that an inventor will attempt to
establish legal rights to his product and introduce his product to market
prior to the optimal technological innovation, or optimally commercial
innovation. Although Professor Kitch has argued that this prospect
function is the most efficient way to analyze the patent system, many
notable scholars disagree.
A negative consequence of the prospect analysis is that a product
which is sub-optimal usually gains enough competitive advantages to
deter the innovation of superior substitute products. 9 Therefore, the
prospects which may have the strongest market presence may also be
the products which bring the least-optimal effectiveness or use. A
greater number of competing innovators would arguably force the most
optimal innovation of the baseline product, upon which successive
competitive efforts would create optimal improvements. Nonetheless,
without such rivalry in the innovative process, inventors are likely to
attempt to commercialize innovations as early as possible, believing that
the first-mover advantages will compensate for any disadvantages that a
sub-optimal product may create.'
55. See id. at 874-75.
56. See Janusz A. Ordover, Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting
Industrial and Intellectual Property, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 503, 510 (1985).
57. Although members of the inventive pool possess baseline scientific information and
know-how this information is functionally different from the information attendant to a
baseline product. Although the aggregate of the scientific information may help the innova-
tor in the development of the invention, the information only creates a scientific framework
for the development of the innovations as opposed to the design framework which is pro-
vided by a baseline product.
58. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 52. Professors Liebowitz and Margolis refer to this market occur-
rence as "getting stuck." See Technology Choice, supra note 44, at 309. One of the most well
known examples of locked-in sub-optimal innovation is the QWERTY keyboard. See Paul
A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am. ECON. REv. 332 (1985). But see
Technology Choice, supra note 44, at 312; S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable
of the Keys, 33 J. L. EON. 1 (1990) (arguing that it is possible to get 'unstuck').
60. See Richard J. Gilbert & David Newbery, Pre-emptive Patenting and the Persis-
tence of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 514, 515 (1982).
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B. Reward Function Failure: IP -Dependent Markets
Have Fewer Competitors
The lack of competitors in certain IP-dependent markets results
from the deterrence of innovators to develop substitute primary prod-
ucts.6' Therefore, instead of developing rival primary products,
innovators choose to develop secondary products that are compatible to
the unrivaled primary products.' The secondary market of compatible
products may be competitive, while leaving a relatively non-competitive
primary product market. The increase in size of the compatible secon-
dary product market has the effect of reinforcing the primary product's
dominance and the primary product's dominance has the effect of redi-
recting inventive resources to the development of compatible secondary
products. 3 I term this redirection of inventive resources "inventive tip-
ping."
Inventive tipping is similar to consumer tipping, which occurs as a
result of network externalities. Whereas network externality based tip-
ping occurs in the dynamics of the user/consumer market, inventive
tipping occurs in the innovation market. Tipping occurs generally when
a baseline product (or in this context, a primary product) has a large in-
stalled base which creates significant network externalities.6 These
externalities/benefits become so great that the use of the product is
widely accepted based on the product's inherent use, as well as the sum
of its externalities. Essentially, the market has tipped over to the side of
the product with the greatest externalities.' Inventive tipping occurs in a
similar manner, with the exception that acceptance of the product and its
network benefits are examined from the inventor/supplier side, as op-
posed to the user/consumer side." For example, there comes a point
where a primary product is sufficiently adopted by the market to rea-
sonably indicate that it will continue to have a significant market
presence.67 Once inventors or developers determine that the baseline
product is the more accepted product (and the one most likely to accrue
network benefits), they will tailor their products to be compatible with
61. See Ordover, supra note 56, at 510-11.
62. See Cohen, supra note 38, at 550.
63. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
64. See id. at 496-97.
65. See id.
66. See David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age: Computer
Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
771, 841-43 (1996).
67. See Cohen, supra note 38, at 541-42.
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that product, essentially adopting the product as a standard.9 An exam-
ple of such tipping can be found in the production of videotapes. When
tape providers had readily determined that VHS recorders had suffi-
ciently overtaken the market from rival Betamax recorders, producers
sold videos in VHS format. 9 This tipping, and the consequent reduction
in sales of Betamax videos, helped to further increase sales of VHS re-
corders and strengthen the VHS installed base.
70
Although the inventors/producers are the ones who effectuate the
supply-side dynamics of the inventive tipping, it is closely related to
demand-side causation.7 Compatibility is a characteristic of technology
products which affects consumer choice and helps define the develop-
ment of markets. Consumers are less likely to demand non-compatible
goods when there is a substitution compatible good.72 To respond to this
demand, inventors and producers allocate more of their resources to
satisfy this consumer demand. Although non-compatible secondary
goods may be optimally developed and designed, their incompatibility
may effectively negate any consumer desirability. 3
The sum result of this inventive tipping and compatibility demand is
that first-mover innovations can narrow product development simply by
establishing an installed base of their initial primary product innovation.
Even if second-comers attempt to innovate around a first-mover's prod-
uct, the second-comer may find that the ancillary compatible goods
markets which developed around the first-movers baseline good have
the effect of suffocating the competitive ability of the second-coiner's
product. Secondary market developers further strengthen the installed
base of the baseline product and establish a new set of compatibility-
based network externalities.
C. Consumer Welfare Implications
A third problem related to non-rivalrous innovation is the impact on
consumer welfare. Apart from the economic efficiencies, the issues
pertaining to the monopoly powers of intellectual property rights hold-
ers and the attendant concerns of optimal patent life, consumers may
suffer as a result of 1) sub-optimal development of the useful sciences,
and 2) monopolistic control of the development of the useful sciences.
68. See id. See also, David Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property: An Economic
Approach, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1109, 1119-29 (1994).
69. See Liebowitz & Margolis, Technology Choice, supra note 44, at 314-16.
70. See id.
71. See id at 295.
72. See id.
73. See id. See also Katz & Shapiro, supra note 46, at 424.
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Although it has been argued that intellectual property rights should
be granted only for those innovations which appear to be optimal, the
Patent Act only demands novelty, utility and nonobviousness.74 The
Constitution only grants power to Congress to promote the "useful
Arts," not only the most useful.75 Nonetheless, the underlying goal of the
clause is to maximize the public welfare by allowing Congress to estab-
lish a system that will encourage innovations to be shared with the
public.76 For example, the Patent Act already sets a bar that the innova-
tion must be useful.' Although this requirement has been severely
weakened, it is evidence of one of the core values of the intellectual
property system; useful developments are favored over frivolous and
non-useful developments.
An intellectual property system that encourages sub-optimal inno-
vation and discourages individuals from innovating is inconsistent with
the goal of promoting useful sciences generally. Although the patent
system does reward innovation, it rewards innovation only up to a point,
and then, as discussed in the above sections, discourages further inno-
vation that may in fact be optimal. Consequently, the systemic
disincentives are contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the Consti-
tution and fail to protect the public welfare as it was originally
construed.
Another implication for consumer welfare is the lack of competitive
choice that results from the innovation disincentives which limit the size
of the primary product market." Assuming that a first-mover's installed
base is significant enough to establish inventive tipping, a consumer
may find that the differential between the externalities of the products
gives her no real choice in determining which technology she will use. 9
Rather than choosing among competing substitutable products within
the same field of technology, she may find the need to choose between
very different technologies because no innovator developed an interme-
diate substitute product.0 Furthermore, the same consumer may find
74. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994). See also Dam, supra note 3, at 257-261.
75. U. S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
76. See Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and
Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 97, 134-44 (1993).
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
78. See supra notes 63 to 73 and accompanying text. Cf. Joseph F. Brodley, The Eco-
nomic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020 (1987) (consumer choice in the secondary product market will likely
not be limited if inventive tipping has occurred).
79. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externali-
ties, 40 J. INDUS. ECON 55, (1992) [hereinafter Product Introduction].
80. See id. But see Liebowitz & Margolis, Technology Choice, supra note 44, at 317
(arguing that an apparently inefficient alternative selection process may still be efficient
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that she has no substantial choice because the secondary compatibility
markets make the choice of the non-dominant technology too costly.8 A
system which fails to encourage competitive innovation may result in
protecting innovators while passing along limited and restrained choice
in the use of such useful sciences, thus harming consumer welfare. 2
As the above assessment of the problems which result from reward
function failure indicates, the disincentives to innovate competing pri-
mary products has the effect of limiting technology and market
development and harms consumer welfare. Although these problems
have a significant impact on the dynamics of the inventive pool, and
further exacerbate reward function failure, both the disincentives and
resulting problems are ignored by the prospect function theorists.
V. WHY THE PROSPECT FUNCTION ANALYSIS DOES NOT REMEDY
REWARD FUNCTION FAILURE AND WHY RIVALRY DOES
A. Inadequacies of the Prospect Function
The prospect theory has already been criticized as understating the
benefits of competitive rivalry. Professors Merges and Nelson have
criticized Kitch's prospect theory, arguing empirical evidence suggests
that competitive development of technological prospects is preferable to
coordinated development.83 They address the limitations of Kitch's
mining model analogy and argue that Kitch's model ignores the ten-
dency of prospectors to exploit their prospects inadequately, as well as
the likelihood that rightholders will sub-optimally develop potential im-
provements. Additionally, they suggest that both the legal and
theoretical limitations which are created by property rights also under-
mine the effectiveness of the prospect theory. In this argument, Merges
and Nelson refute Kitch's expansive view of property rights." Doubting
that unrivaled rightholders would exploit their rights as actively and
efficiently as they would in a competitive environment, they are wary of
expanding the property rights and endorse rivalry in the innovation
process. Additionally, unlike Kitch, they provide historically-based em-
pirical evidence which supports their theory.86
when considering consumer choice); Joseph Farrell & Garth Soloner, Standardization &
Variety, 20 EcoN. LETTERS 71 (1986).
81. See Product Introduction, supra note 79, at 72-74.
82. See Brodley, supra note 78, at 1032-35.
83. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 30, at 872.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 871-75.
86. See id. at 884-915.
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In addition to the limitations of the Kitch model stated by Professors
Merges and Nelson, Professor Kitch's theory is also limited in that it
does not anticipate the interrelation of several discrete prospects.'
Kitch's model anticipates that each prospect, like a mineralization, is a
singular and discrete claim that can be exploited without any interrela-
tion to a separate discrete claim.88 This analysis breaks down when one
prospect is relied upon by other prospects for purposes of compatibility
and interoperability. Whereas Kitch anticipates that the prospects are
primarily exploited in a manner which improves the original broad
claim, he fails to foresee the impacts the exploitation of that prospect
will have on the behavior of other prospectors. The behavioral impacts
occur in two ways: 1) increased innovative activity in areas of technol-
ogy which are compatible to the original claim, and 2) increased activity
in the development of compatible technologies.
To borrow Kitch's mineral analogy, when a prospector located min-
eralizations in a certain area, the usual result was increased prospect
activity in that particular area. This increased activity did not affect the
prospector's original claim, so long as he had filed the proper claims.
Nonetheless, although there may have been other areas with greater
amounts of mineralization, the tendency was to prospect the region
which had already proved to be mineralized.8Y The greater the permitted
claim sizes, the fewer the prospectors could benefit from the find. Al-
though it was understood that a prospector could develop his own
prospect, it was uncommon to find one claim holder organizing the ex-
ploitation of the entire region, even if he was the first to locate the
mineralized area.' Each prospector could exploit his particular claim in
any manner, creating rivalry in the development of claims. Conse-
quently, Kitch's theory overlooks the fact that this rivalry in exploiting
the prospect is deterred when the permissible claim size is too big.9'
87. See Cohen, supra note 38, at 551-53 (discussing complementary components).
88. See Kitch, supra note 5, at 285-86. Although Kitch argues that two unrelated claims
may be more efficiently developed under unified control, he does not posit any other sub-
stantial interrelation.
89. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 4, at 313-16. For historical and economic
summaries of the California Gold Rush, one of the most famous periods of mineralization
activity in U.S. history, see Paula Mitchell Marks, Precious Dust: The American Gold Rush
Era, 1848-1900 (1994); John R. Umbeck, A Theory of Property Rights with Application to
the California Gold Rush (1981).
90. Railroads provided much of the ability to coordinate mineralization exploitation by
developing the regional networking of mineral prospects. See generally, Robert William
Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History (1964);
Sarah H. Gordon, Passage to Union: How the Railroads Transformed American Life, 1829-
1929 (1996); George Rogers Taylor & Irene D. Neu, The American Railroad Network,
1861-1890 (1956).
91. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 4, at 315-16.
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The patent system works much the same way. When patent rights
are claimed in a particular technology, and that technology is adopted
by consumers, there is increased prospecting activity in that technologi-
cal field.' Innovators prospect compatible technological innovations
and claim patent rights. The rivalry in developing these complementary
or compatible products helps create optimal innovation and consumer
choice.93 If the original patent holder was granted too expansive a claim,
there would be no ability to establish any technological prospects, nor
would rivalrous innovation occur among compatible products because
the patent holder's rights would foreclose the development of all com-
patible technologies.9'
Secondary innovations that evolve from the primary prospect are
also foreclosed in Kitch's theory. This foreclosure can be exemplified
by the mineralization theory as well. Rather than using mineralization
generally, let us use a high-nitrate mineralization such as limestone,
which is a type of mineralization that enhances the soil for cultivation.
A prospector searching for mineralizations of limestone could make a
claim for the area in which the mineralization could be found. None-
theless, there are limitations to the property rights which he claimed. He
has no rights in determining how the surface land is used. Therefore, if a
farmer determines that the land is highly arable, the prospector has no
ability to prevent the farmer from using the land above the prospect for
farming. Significantly, the claim holder has the ability to extract the
minerals but not to control the information regarding the location of the
mineralization, which is useful in determining the most arable land.
In patent theory, the information pertaining to the claim is also re-
leased to the public by means of public disclosures. 9 But unlike the
limitations in the mineralization example, a patent holder may be able to
control the use of the information that is not expressly granted by the
patent. If the patented technology gains numerous competitive advan-
tages, the patent holder may be able to control the entire area of
technology, thus limiting the prospecting of the technology for alterna-
tive or rivalrous purposes.9 Therefore, the distinction in the analogy,
which Kitch overlooks, is that patent law lacks the division that exists
between mineral rights and real estate rights. Rather, patent law creates
a bundle of rights, which affects the foreclosure of certain innovation.
Whereas in the mineral prospect analogy, a mineral rights holder cannot
92. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 30, at 873-74,
93. See id. at 873.
94. See generally Oddi, supra note 11.
95. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
96. See supra notes 30-52 and accompanying text.
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foreclose competition for the real estate in the area of the claim, a patent
holder does have the ability to foreclose competition in the relevant in-
novation market.
Nonetheless, the foreclosure of competition in the innovation mar-
ket is not likely to occur in every technological field.' It is more likely
to occur when there are two innovation markets which are closely re-
lated and contain interconnected products 8 These markets, which
contain the primary and secondary products, are those which are most
susceptible to the harms of innovation disincentives. Because of the
symbiotic relationship of the primary and secondary products, either a
decrease in innovation or an occurrence of inventive tipping in one
market has significant effects in the development of the other market.
Therefore, one way to address some of the problems resulting from re-
ward function failure is to spur innovative competition. The following
section addresses the theoretical framework of why encouraging inno-
vational rivalry can be an important and functional element remedying
reward function failure.
B. Solving Reward Function Failure: Rivalry in the Innovative Process
Numerous theorists have offered alternative means to moderate the
problems which develop as a result of non-competitive innovation. Ad-
justing both patent life and scope has been suggested," as has instituting
compulsory licensing."° Therefore, much of the literature focuses on
altering the elements which are generally considered part of the reward
function. Rather than modifying the length and scope patent grants, I
propose the patent system should be modified in a manner which reme-
dies reward function failure by modifying the nature of the patent grants
and technologies for which they are granted. Whereas the modification
of patent scope affects the development of follow-on innovations and
improvements, it does not address the disincentives to innovate primary
products. Overbroad patent scope may deter innovation, but modifying
the scope will not remove all of the deterrence created by reward func-
tion failure.'O° Rather, the promotion of innovation rivalry, by modifying
the application of patent grants, helps counter the systemic problems of
97. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 30, at 881.
98. See id.
99. See id. See also F. M. Scherer, Nordhaus's Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geo-
metric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 422 (1972).
100. See generally Cole M. Fauver, Comment, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the
United States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 666 (1988). See
also Ralph Oman, The Compulsory License Redux: Will It Survive in a Changing Market-
place?, 5 CaRDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (1986).
101. See discussion supra Parts Im.A-B.
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reward function failure, and consequently promotes, rather than dis-
courages, innovation.
Competitive innovation also prevents efficiency benefits in the in-
novative process and protects consumer welfare. In recent years, the use
of rivalry as an economic policy goal has been subordinated by the use
of efficiency-based standards of competition." Nonetheless, there have
been some attempts to establish rivalry as the dominant goal in eco-
nomics-based law.°3 This resurgence of rivalry, based largely on the
arguments that rivalry creates efficiencies in innovation, helps eliminate
X-inefficiencies, and increases consumer welfare."°
X-inefficiencies occur when firms do not face regular competition
in their industry, and thus do not face the same production pressures
which occur in a fully competitive market.1"' Although these inefficien-
cies are normally considered to exist primarily in the production
process, there is evidence that such inefficiencies may also exist in the
innovative process.' In fact, there may be more to lose from X-
inefficiencies in the innovative process. Rather than higher unit costs,
the harm may be sub-optimal innovation that may have numerous mul-
tiplying effects in the innovation process.' 7 Although a thorough
evaluation of the existence of X-inefficiencies is difficult, 3 some em-
pirical evidence has illustrated that rivalry limits the existence of
innovative characteristics that are similar to X-inefficiencies.' 9
Rivalry also enhances consumer welfare by promoting innovative
efficiency and choice. The specific determination of what constitutes
consumer welfare is varied." In the innovation context, optimal inno-
vation at the lowest cost is beneficial to consumer welfare."' By
increasing competitive tensions, rivalry forces innovators to maximize
their efforts so as to withstand the rigors of the market." Although the
costs which are incurred by increased innovative efforts may reduce
102. See Dam, supra note 3, at 264. See also Harry S. Gerla, Restoring Rivalry as a
Central Concept in Antitrust Law, 75 NEB. L. REV. 209, 210 (1996).
103. See Gerla, supra note 102, at 211.
104. See id. For a definition of X-inefficiencies see infra notes 105-109 and accompa-
nying text.
105. See ROGER S. FRANTZ, X-EFFICIENCY: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND APPLICATIONS 2-
3 (1988).
106. See Gerla, supra note 102 at 228.
107. See id. at 238-39.
108. See id. at 227-28.
109. See id. See also Merges & Nelson, supra note 30, at 873 n. 143. See generally,
F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 668-72 (3d ed. 1990).
110. See Brodley, supra note 78, at 1020, 1032.
111. See id.
112. See generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 30.
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some allocative efficiencies, innovative efficiencies increase the aggre-
gate consumer welfare benefits above those created by the allocative
efficiencies."' Consumers benefit foremost from increased choice
among innovations of variable price and quality.114 Another benefit is
that rivalry creates the incentive for numerous competitors to explore
innovative development in areas which they would not otherwise ex-
plore, thus creating the potential for even greater innovative
efficiencies."' These new innovations create even more consumer
choice. Therefore, the promotion of rivalry and innovative efficiencies
created by such rivalry provides benefits exceeding pure industrial-
based allocative efficiencies.
6
Although rivalry appears to provide reasonable benefits that create
both efficiencies and public welfare, introducing rivalry to innovation
markets raises significant questions related to the nature and scope of
intellectual property protection. Specifically, the type of patent protec-
tion, if there is any to be granted at all, may depend greatly on the type
of technology."7 Additionally, the close relationship between primary
and secondary technologies and products may also affect the nature of
the protection to be provided. Therefore, when determining the nature of
patent protection in light of the policy goal of innovative rivalry, the
technologies which raise the greatest number of problems are those
which have 1) a high propensity for product success based on the aggre-
gate network externalities which the product creates, and 2) a proximate
relationship between primary and secondary products. One technology
which matches these criteria is computer software. The following sec-
tion reviews the dynamics of the computer software market and
proposes a framework for evaluating potential types of patent grants
which may best enhance innovative rivalry and prevent reward function
failure in this particular technology.
113. See Gerla, supra note 102, at 229-30. See also Brodley, supra note 78, at 1027-
33.
114. See Brodley, supra note 78, at 1033.
115. See generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 30.
116. See Brodley, supra note 78, at 1027.
117. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 30, at 883.
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VI. CURING REWARD FUNCTION FAILURE: THE SPECIAL PROBLEM
OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
A. Technical Aspects of Computer Software
Computer software programs, at a very basic level, can be divided
into two categories: 1) operating systems and 2) applications. "8 Each of
these categories provides a different function in computer processing
but are co-related. Although the division between what constitutes an
application and what constitutes a function of an operating system has
been blurred, for the initial purposes of this discussion it is important to
understand the distinctions between these types of programs." 9
An operating system is the program which coordinates all activity
on a computer, essentially providing a basic roadmap for the function-
ality of the hardware. l0 Its key tasks are to recognize and control input
and output functions, manage file directories, and manage the behavior
of the external peripheral functions of the computer. 12' Additionally, the
operating system manages the processing schedule of the microproces-
sor and controls resource usage."
One of the most essential attributes of the operating system is the
software platform.2 The platform is the basic framework which is used
to run application programs. For an application to run successfully on a
particular operating system, the program must be designed in a manner
that makes it compatible with the operating system's software plat-
form. 2' Normally this design is based on the use of a common set of
application programming interfaces (APIs) which allow the application
to communicate with the operating system in the same language and can
create compatibility. 22 Therefore, the development of a platform and its
APIs is a necessary element for the development of applications.
118. For an overview of computer technology and the relevant market attributes, see
Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1329,
1334 (1987) [hereinafter Computer Software] (discussing computer technology in general as
well as the relevant market attributes).
119. Although this paper reviews the traditional distinctions between operating systems
and applications, recent action by the Department of Justice and the litigation which has
ensued has challenged the definition of an operation system.
120. See Computer Software, supra note 118, at 1334.
121. See PC Webopedia, Operating System (visited October 1, 1998) <http://
webopedia.intemet.com/OperatingSystems/operatingsystem.html>.
122. See id.
123. See PC Webopedia, Platform (visited October 1, 1998) <http://
webopedia.internet.com/TERM/p/platform.html>.
124. See id.
125. See PC Webopedia, API (visited October 1, 1998) <http:ll
webopedia.internet.com/TERM/A/API.html>.
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Applications are programs that create end-user functionality, 26 such
as word processors, spreadsheets, and design programs." Applications
are essentially high level sets of commands that use the underlying
computer processing ability to serve specific functions. Unlike operat-
ing systems which manage system resources, applications are the higher
level products of those resources. As stated above, all applications con-
tain Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) which communicate
with the software platform. Without APIs, applications will not initial-
ize or function with the software platform, will be unable to request
system resources, and will possess no independent use in regard to that
particular computer platform.
Therefore, in light of platforms and applications, APIs are essen-
tially the technical program specifications which need to be present for
applications (which in this case constitute secondary products) to run
properly on a platform (the primary product). The designer of the oper-
ating system/platform determines the APIs. An application designer can
use any API of his choice, but if he intends for the application to be run
on a specific platform, he needs to use those platform-specific APIs. l'
B. The Special Role of APIs and Software Platforms
in the Application Market
When a software programmer designs an application program, he
must make a choice as to the software platform on which the program
will run.'29 This decision is likely to be affected by numerous factors.
Foremost, the developer will want to insure that he chooses the operat-
ing system which will maximize the commercial success of his
application. Therefore, the developer will most likely choose the oper-
ating system with the highest commercial success or is popular in the
market in which the application is most likely to be used.30 The network
externalities of the most successful operating system provide powerful
126. See Computer Software, supra note 118, at 1334. See also Peter S. Menell, An
Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REv.
1045, 1050-57 (1989) [hereinafter Application Programs]; PC Webopedia, Application,
(visited October 1, 1998) <http://webopedia.intemet.com/iERM/A/Application.html>.
127. See Application Programs, supra note 126, at 1051.
128. Recent technological developments have led to the creation of cross-platform
functionality by means of the Java language. Java essentially creates another thin software
platform over all other platforms, and allows for applications written in Java to run across
any platform supporting Java. The cross-platform quality allows application designers to
"write once, run everywhere." Although this technology has been extremely popular in the
application industry, it has not been without controversy. For review of the Java controversy
and the related legal issues, see Lemley & McGowan, supra note 63.
129. See Computer Software, supra note 118, at 1341-42.
130. See id. at 1341.
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incentives for the application developer to choose that particular system
over others both because of its strong market position and because of
the consumer benefits stemming from the network externalities. From
the application developer's viewpoint, the application's success is par-
tially dependent on the continued success of the operating system. A
commercially unpopular operating system, although technically supe-
rior, may neither have sufficient network benefits nor the potential
network benefits to attract applications.' Therefore, the choice of oper-
ating system, from the developer's perspective, is more dependent on
market dynamics rather than technical functionality. 132 Although other
factors may affect the developer's decision, empirical evidence indi-
cates that developers tend to design applications which are compatible
with the most successful system on the market, even if that system is
not the most technically superior alternative.
33
Once the choice of operating system has been made, the developer
must acquire the specific APIs which will create interoperability. The
proprietary nature of the APIs thus creates the transactional issues
which are raised in application development. In almost all cases, the
programmer will need to undertake measures to ensure that the applica-
tion contains all the elements necessary to run on the specific platform.
These measures usually consist of the licensing of patent or copyright
rights as well as the licensing of trademarks.
C. Innovation Market Implications of Technical Aspects
of Computer Software
As noted above, a significant implication of the relationship be-
tween operating systems and platforms is that the development of
applications depends largely on the software platforms of operating
systems. The market success of operating systems consequently has an
impact on the development of application programs. Those developers
who seek to maximize the commercial success of their application must
choose compatibility with the most commercially successful operating
system. Alternatively, developers of alternative operating systems will
find increased difficulty in attracting application developers to choose
compatibility with rival systems. The circular result here is that the
growth of the compatible application innovation market further expands
the competitive advantages of the particular operating system, and the
enhanced competitive advantage of the operating system encourages
131. See Computer Software, supra note 118, at 1342-43.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1341-43. See also Friedman, supra note 68, at 1120.
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growth in the compatible application innovation market. The number of
rival operating systems is limited by the innovation in the application
market. Therefore, to encourage rivalry in the operating system innova-
tion market, one of the roots of the dynamic must be addressed-the
intellectual property protection of software platforms.
D. Preventing Failure: Reevaluating Protection
for Software PlatformsM
In order to promote rivalry in the development of operating systems,
the special nature of software platforms should be reflected by the in-
tellectual property protection which is granted. The key question is how
platforms should be protected considering their special nature. Tailoring
a type of protection for platforms raises a host of questions, including
the determination of what constitutes a software platform and what, if
any, proprietary protection should be granted. The answers to these
questions raise the possibility that the best way to protect the market
regulation function of the patent system in regard to operating systems
is to design sui generis or hybrid protection for software platforms.
1. Proprietary Protection: Determining the Scope
The first question relating to the special case of computer platforms
is how to define the platform itself. One way to perceive the software
platform is to recognize it as the central component of the operating
system. If this is the case, then the operating system itself may be the
property which needs protection. Alternatively, if the software platform
is merely one discrete element in the operating system, without which
the operating system would still serve a majority of its functionality,
perhaps only the code which makes up the routines involved in the
software platform should be considered as the platform.
The latter alternative raises another significant question related to
which portions of the actual code should be affected by alternative
treatment of platforms. Not all of the code which creates the software
platform is specifically assignable to the interoperability function of the
platform. Portions of the platform code relate to the functions of the
user interface, and may direct system resources toward these func-
tions.' Although applications usually manipulate the user interface, the
134. The following framework for altering the protection of software platforms does
not cure the present platform monopoly, rather it provides forward-looking analysis. If the
following framework would have been adopted, it would likely have prevented the high
concentration of competitors currently existing in the operating system market.
135. The user interface consists of both the look and feel of the computer as well as the
user/computer interaction. The interface of a software program may include the way the
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platform may synthesize the application interface commands with the
operating system's user interface commands. Therefore, when deter-
mining the relevant platform code, a distinction may be drawn between
the code which creates the interoperability functions of software plat-
forms and the code which creates or directs the user interface.
However, drawing such a distinction may raise problems because
interface compatibility may be a significantly desirable commercial at-
tribute of applications. For example, when using the Microsoft
Windows platform, a computer can seamlessly combine the Windows
interface with the interfaces of applications designed to be compatible
with Windows. Conversely, when a user attempts to run a MS-DOS ap-
plication, the computer must reset the user interface to DOS standards.
This reset usually results in the computer switching interfaces during
the time that the non-Windows application is being used. Although the
change in interface may not have significant functional implications, it
does alter the seamless interface created by Windows-compatible applica-
tions. Nonetheless, determining the distinction between interoperability
code and interface code may be a significant issue in determining the
components of a software platform.
Although interface compatibility may not be as technically significant
as functional interoperability, dividing the two may have significant
commercial effects. By separating the platform code in such a manner, it
is possible that application developers could develop functionally in-
teroperable software. However, consumers would still not respond to the
applications because of the interface incompatibility. Thus, in this case,
excessively limiting the boundaries of the operating system could have
drastic commercial effects.
The aforementioned problems all raise one significant issue: the
boundaries of the operating system are not easily determined. Perhaps
technological innovation will make this distinction clearer. Recent
events have highlighted the fact that operating systems can perform
much more functionality than basic organizational processing decisions
and incorporate new functions which are more commonly associated
with software applications. If this is the case, although it may be more
difficult to distinguish the applications from the operating system, it
may be easier to distinguish the software platform from the rest of the
application-type functions of the operating system.
program is displayed, the way the program is prompted by commands, as well as the means
by which the user can alter or customize the program.
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2. Defining the Proprietary Nature of Software Platforms
In addition to the questions regarding scope are the questions re-
lated to defining the proprietary nature of software platforms. As a
result of their importance in the innovation markets of applications and
operating systems, software platforms have several attributes which
make it difficult to define their proprietary nature. In fact, software plat-
forms have more similarities to non-proprietary concepts such as
languages, algorithms, and industry know-how. Therefore, one possible
alternative is to determine whether or not the software platform ele-
ments of an operating system are unprotectable because of their
underlying importance to the functionality of all other software.
This alternative is rooted in the argument that software platforms
serve functions similar to those of algorithms, scientific principles and
languages. Although software platforms are not inherently self-limiting
in their expression, they are the principal building blocks to software
interoperability. As a result, the same justifications which are used to
deny patentability to the aforementioned concepts apply to software
platforms. For example, an algorithm is not proprietary because it is a
mathematical function and not a machine or process and therefore is
unpatentable under the Patent Act.3 6 The algorithm, as a mathematically
created function, is inseparable from the larger structure of mathemati-
cal science.'37 By appropriating an algorithm, a patent holder could
exclude others (who do not license the algorithm) from performing
mathematical functions which may depend on the use or variation of the
algorithm. This exclusion not only limits the development of mathe-
matical theory, but also limits the development of technologies which
could use the algorithm to perform processes or mechanical functions.
Similarly, a person appropriating a software platform would have
the ability to foreclose the development of other software programs and
functions. But substitute platforms, market dynamics and innovation
disincentives may make the development of such a substitute less likely.
By excluding others from the software platform's basic interoperability
function, a patent holder would be denying all software developers half
of the equation necessary for the development of functional software. 3'
Essentially, the interoperability function of a software platform tran-
scends a mere idea or process. It is the principal means of operating
136. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-96 (1978) (holding that granting a patent
to Flook would have the result of patenting a mathematical formula). But see Donald S.
Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Prr. L. REv. 959 (1986).
137. See Parker, 436 U.S. at 591-92.
138. See Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990).
To Innovate or Not to Innovate
software, just as algorithms are a principal means of mathematical
analysis. Therefore, rejecting patent protection for software platforms
would be both theoretically and legally consistent.
The alternative that software platforms be considered unprotectable
does raise a difficult question of what platform components can still be
protected by other intellectual property protection. For example, if the
APIs are the components that are essential to interoperability, it is pos-
sible that the remainder of the platform may still qualify for other types
of intellectual property protection such as copyright. A careful distinc-
tion must be drawn between these components so that the lack of
protection of the platform will still provide incentives for platform in-
novation while reducing the harms that result from the exclusivity of
proprietary rights.9
The exclusion of the software platform's compatibility components
from patent protection removes two significant barriers to the develop-
ment of rivalry in the innovation of software. First, the relationship
between applications and platforms will cease to be a limiting factor in
the development of software platforms. Application developers will not
need to make a choice regarding platform compatibility because all of
the APIs and other compatibility information will be costless. There-
fore, a developer will be able to acquire all APIs for use in an
application and not be limited by compatibility costs. Since application
developers will not need to make such a choice, the potential for inven-
tive tipping will be mitigated. Consequently, platform developers will
no longer be subject to a significant disincentive for inventing a rival
software platform.
The second barrier which is removed is that the innovation market
dynamics will be altered to recreate benefits which would otherwise be
created by the reward function. Although the lack of rewards created by
patentability may be dissipated, rival developers may have other suffi-
cient rewards for rivalrous development. If the non-compatibility related
components are still protected, a developer may have sufficient justifi-
cation for developing a new operating system based on an unprotected
software platform. Specifically, the benefits received from developing a
new operating system may outweigh the lost benefits of releasing a new
139. Such a distinction has been analogized to the idea-expression dichotomy in copy-
right law. See Maximilian R. Peterson, Note, Now You See It, Now You Don't. Was it a
Patentable Machine or an Unpatentable "Algorithm"? On Principle and Erpediency in
Current Patent Law Doctrines Relating to Compute-Implemented Inventions, 64 GEo. WASH.
L. RFv. 90, 122 (1995). Analogizing the machine-computer dichotomy to the idea expres-
sion dichotomy, Peterson suggests the application of an abstractions-like test. See id. at 123-
124. Similar reasoning could be used in supporting an Altai-like test in relation to the dis-
tinctions between compatibility and interface components.
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and improved non-proprietary platform component. Application devel-
opers, no longer limited by inventive tipping, will be able to easily
enhance the marketability of any new software platform because they
can add compatibility easily and without cost. Therefore, operating
systems will be a stronger market competitor regardless of whether or
not it is the first to market.
Essentially, by leaving software platforms unprotected, the first-
mover advantages are significantly limited, and the disincentives they
create are removed. As a result of such a removal, second comers are
not subjected to the dynamics of reward function failure. Rivalry among
platforms will develop because path dependence and lock-in will no
longer limit the potential for second-comer success. Rather, the open
aspects of software platforms will create more choices for platforms
without sacrificing application compatibility."4 As a result, leaving
software applications unprotected will create competition in both the
innovation market as well as the product market, and will provide a
remedy for the harms of reward function failure.
3. Potential Sui Generis Protection for Software Platforms
The creation of sui generis protection for computer programs has
been a subject of much academic discussion in recent years.4 These
arguments resonate in the particular situation of software platforms. As
noted above, the current protections available for computer programs do
not prevent reward function failure in the operating system innovation
market. Consequently, alternative protections must be designed to better
protect innovation market competition. These protections may be either
modified proprietary protections, compulsory licensing requirements, or
a limited general public license requirement. Although these three pro-
tections are diametrically different (one grants property rights, whereas
the other two create a type of public good), they all serve the function of
creating competition in the innovation market.
An example of a modified proprietary protection for software plat-
forms is a patent system which leaves certain components unprotected,
while designating other components to be patentable. Another alterna-
tive is the creation of an altogether new protection which is a hybrid of
140. Software platform components may be standardized by industry participants
through licensing or other means. See generally, Friedman, supra note 68, at 1123 to 24;
Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REv.
1041, 1043-54 (1996).
141. See generally Application Programs, supra note 126; Computer Software, supra
note 118; J.H. Reichnan, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLuM. L. REv. 2432 (1992); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308 (1994).
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patent and copyright laws.'42 For both alternatives, the proprietary rights
that are created would need to be sufficiently limited to prevent reward
function failure in the innovative market, but be sufficiently broad to
promote innovative rivalry. Nonetheless, the sui generis protection
should be limited only to those software platform components which
create compatibility (e.g. APIs) and should not necessarily be extended
to other non-essential components.
The second alternative, compulsory licensing of the compatibility
elements, is not novel, but it does demand a closer examination in re-
gard to software platforms. The compulsory license may be limited only
to those elements of the operating system which compose the software
platform. The remaining portion of the operating system code will retain
the attributes of a patented invention. Again the difficulty in this hybrid
may be in determining the make-up of the platform. This problem, how-
ever, does not make it impracticable. The compulsory license may be
structured so that the actual design of the compatibility component need
not be licensed, but the code needed to make applications compatible
with the platform is subject to a license. Such a license would prevent
the duplication of the platform but would force the function of the plat-
form to be licensed. This license is similar to the "Automatic Anti-
Cloning Protection Followed by an Automatic Royalty-Bearing Li-
cense" as discussed by Professor Samuelson.'43
Compulsory licensing does not completely cure reward function
failure and the disincentives for rivalrous innovation. In one respect, the
compulsory licensing element will prevent reward function failure by
limiting the excess competitive advantages of a first-mover. Competing
innovators will be allowed to incorporate rival software platforms into
their operating system. The overall result of this practice will be to cre-
ate cross platform compatibility by default.
Nonetheless, the compulsory licensing framework does not solve
the problems related to inventive tipping. Although application devel-
opers would have the platform's compatibility codes available for
licensing, the developer would still need to make cost-based decisions
regarding the choice of platform. Assuming application developers can-
not license every platform code (unless the licensing fees are
insignificant), the application market will still tilt towards one particular
platform. An alternative would be to create a license which covers all
the software platform compatibility components of all the rival software
platforms. Such a universal license fee could then be split among all the
software platform owners covered by the license. This license is similar
142. See Reichman, supra note 141, at 2502-503.
143. See Samuelson et al., supra note 141, at 2414-15.
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to a system proposed for software innovations based on registration and
automatic licensing. 44 Furthermore, this alternative might solve the
cost-based problems associated with the compulsory license, thus pre-
venting a significant innovation disincentive.
The last type of alternative to a modified proprietary system is a
non-proprietary general public license (GPL) system for software plat-
forms similar to the one developed by the Free Software Foundation.45
The GPL is a hybrid of contract and copyright law, creating proprietary
rights while also granting a license which allows the modification of the
copyrighted work. The hybrid's goal is to further development of the
material covered by the GPL while preventing its appropriability.'" Al-
though arguments against such a private propertization of intellectual
property rights exist, these arguments are based on the claim that the
overall benefits to society are based on the underlying principal of prop-
erty rights. Contrary to this argument, in the context of software
platforms, the GPL may produce optimal and beneficial results.
In such a system, the software platform (or at least its compatibility
components) would be subject to a GPL and freely distributed. If devel-
opers improved the platform, they would be required to disclose the
improvements by means of documentation. Although the platform de-
velopers would not be able to control the development of the platform,
they would be certain that no other developer could appropriate the pro-
prietary rights either. The mandatory disclosure would assure all
developers that trade secrets will not balkanize the platform.
Furthermore, there would still be incentive to innovate platforms
because the benefits would accrue to the development community as a
whole. As a result of such a distribution of benefits, there would be a
community-wide effort to develop the platform to its most superior
form, thus preventing sub-optimal innovation.' While the essential na-
ture of the reward would be different, it would still serve the same
function, providing incentives to innovate. 148 An operating system de-
veloper, possessing all the compatibility-related information, could then
focus on developing other aspects of the operating system. Conse-
quently, competition in the operating system market could be enhanced
144. See id. at 2426-29.
145. See The GNU Project and the Free Software Foundation (FSF) (visited Nov. 19,
1998) <http://www.gnu.org/home.html>.
146. See GNU Library General Public License (visited Nov. 19, 1998) <http:ll
www.gnu.org/copyleft/lgpl.html>.
147. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
148. Since the nature of the reward function is different under the GPL, coordinated
development as opposed to rivalrous innovation would be a more preferable dynamic for the
innovation market.
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by placing all the developers on the same level in regard to compatibil-
ity. Additionally, inventive tipping would become meaningless because
all platforms would share the same components, making the applica-
tions universally compatible.
Although these alternatives are not flawless, they serve as a starting
point for examining what type of legal protection should be tailored for
software platforms. In order to prevent the reward function failure in the
operating system market, steps must be taken to prevent the occurrence
of disincentives to innovate, as well as a basis for rivalry in develop-
ment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Reward function failure has been a long-neglected occurrence
within the patent system and devices to remedy it have been grossly un-
derrepresented in the current workings of patent regulation. As legal and
economic dynamics have had the effect of limiting the effectiveness of
the reward functions of the patent systems to the point where even the
prospect function cannot explain the results, the importance of reestab-
lishing the reward function has become paramount. In order to correct
these failures, innovative rivalry must be encouraged in intellectual
property systems, whether by modifying the proprietary systems, or by
creating a new non-proprietary paradigm.
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